Equilibrium discovery and preopening mechanisms in an experimental market.
Introduction
communication during the nonbinding preopening period does not enhance coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. In contrast, with a binding preopening period, traders cannot send manipulative orders. Correspondingly, we find that the binding preopening mechanism enhances coordination on the high liquidity and high gains from trade equilibrium.
Our results suggest that preplay communication mechanisms can be fragile. Underscoring this fragility is one contribution of our paper relative to the previous literature. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1992) , Charness (2000) and Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that, in a cooperation game, nonbinding preplay communication fosters coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium when the parameters of the game are constant. In contrast, we consider the case where participants face varying parameter constellations, some for which coordinating on Pareto dominant outcomes is feasible, others in which such win-win situations are not equilibrium outcomes. We show that the latter situation generates bitter experiences, which then precludes coordination via nonbinding preplay communication. 9 Another contribution of our paper is to suggest an alternative mechanism to pure cheap talk, in which this problem is mitigated. In our experiment, when preopening orders are binding, coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium is often observed. And this is robust to bad initial conditions, with low initial gains from trade. In this market structure, indeed, participants don't have the opportunity to make false promises and then breach them. Thus, they can't loose trust in the possibility to coordinate on win-win situations. And they take advantage of the sequencing of the game to coordinate on high gains from trade. The corresponding high performance of the market with a binding preopening period, observed in our experiment, is in line with the predictions of the trembling hand equilibrium concept.
The next section describes our trading game, its equilibria and our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. The instructions given to the participants are in the appendix.
The trading game
In financial markets, opening prices are often set in uniform price auctions, referred to as call auctions. This is the case, for instance, in the two major European stock markets: Euronext and Xetra, as well as in other bourses throughout the world, such as, e.g., the Brazilian stock exchange. Recognizing that equilibrium discovery is a difficult task, several market organizers have designed 9 Note also that, in our setup, preplay announcements to play the Pareto dominant equilibrium are not self-enforcing in the Aumann (1990) sense. This differs from the case studied by Cooper et al (1992) . Clark et al (2001) also study preplay communication in a setting where announces are not self enforcing. They find that cooperation is announced 81% of the time, but played only 42% of the time. Our results on the nonbinding preopening period are consistent with their findings. preplay communication mechanisms. Thus, Euronext or the Brazilian and the Australian stock exchanges feature a preopening period whereby traders can submit or cancel limit orders and tentative prices are set (see Biais, Hillion and Spatt, 1999) . In this section, we present a stylized trading game designed to capture some important features of such markets. There is one buyer and one seller who differ in terms of their private valuation of the asset. The buyer assigns value v = 4 to the asset, up toq units, and then 0. The cost to the seller of providing the good is c = 0 up toq units, and then infinity. Potential gains from trade forq units are: (v − c)q = 4q. The players know the structure and the parameters of the game, i.e., we consider a complete information setting.
The call auction without preopening
In the pure call auction without preopening period, buyers and sellers simultaneously post schedules of limit orders, and thus demand and supply curves. Once the orders have been placed, the supply and demand curves are confronted and the price is set to maximize the number of shares traded. This is a uniform price double auction, i.e., all orders are executed at the same price. If more than one price maximizes volume, then we assume the transaction price is an arithmetic average of the candidate prices.
We study a very simple form of this market. One buyer and one seller are matched. Each trader has the choice between two schedules of limit orders only. The buyer can opt for a rather unaggressive schedule, denoted by B1. This involves a limit order to buy 8 units if the price is not above 2, and another order to buyq − 8 additional units if the price is not above 1. Obviously, we assume thatq > 8. Alternatively, he can opt for a more aggressive schedule, for which demand is shifted upward and which we denote by B2. This involves a limit order to buy 8 units if the price is not above 3, and another order, to buyq − 8 units if the price is not above 2. Symmetrically, the seller can choose between two schedules: S1 and S2. The former involves a limit order to sell 8 units if the price is not below 2 and another order to sellq − 8 units if the price is not below 3. The latter involves a limit order to sell 8 units if the price is not below 1 and another order, to sellq − 8 units if the price is not below 2. As an illustration, the supply and demand curves corresponding to these schedules of limit orders forq = 11 are plotted in Figure 1 . The players can also choose not to submit any orders. This is denoted by S0 and B0 for sellers and buyers, respectively.
If both traders opt for aggressive limit orders (S2 and B2), the market clearing price is 2 and the corresponding volume isq. If both traders opt for less aggressive orders (B1 and S1), the price is still 2, but trading volume is equal to 8. If the buyer is aggressive, but not the seller (B2 and S1) then trading volume is 8 and the price is pushed up to 2.5. If the seller is aggressive, but not the buyer (B1 and S2) then again trading volume is 8, but the price is pushed down to 1.5. Thus, each trader faces a trade-off: He can choose to place an aggressive schedule, potentially generating greater gains, but at the risk of an adverse price move. This risk depends on whether or not the other trader aggressively provides liquidity. This can be interpreted as liquidity risk.
Discarding S0 and B0, which are weakly dominated, the situation faced by traders in the pure call auction can be represented as a normal form game, where the payoff of the seller is the first number in each cell, and the payoff of the buyer is the second number in each cell:
Seller:
Buyer:
B1 B2 S1 (16, 16) (20, 12) S2 (12, 20) (2q, 2q)
In the off-diagonal cells, the trader with the less aggressive schedule earns greater gains than his or her counterparty. Note also that, sinceq > 8, the pair of actions which maximizes the total gains from trade is (S2, B2). But will this allocation arise in equilibrium? The answer is given in the next proposition (whose proof is obvious and omitted).
Proposition 1 Consider the pure call auction. No trade, i.e., (S0, B0), is a Nash equilibrium, but it involves weakly dominated strategies. Ifq < 10, then (S1, B1) is the only undominated Nash equilibrium. Ifq > 10, there are (on top of the no-trade equilibrium) two pure strategy equilibria: (S1, B1) and (S2, B2), as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium whereby, each trader selects the aggressive schedule, S2 or B2, with probability 2/(q − 8).
In our experiment we want to include both the prisoner's dilemma situation, where the unique Nash equilibrium is (S1, B1), and the cooperative situation whereby both (S2, B2) and (S1, B1) are equilibria. Thus, we will consider two possible parameter values:q = 9 andq = 11. In the latter case, (S2, B2) is Pareto dominant while (S1, B1) is risk dominant. 
The call auction with a preopening period
While some stock markets operate without formal preopening period, in other bourses there is a preopening period during which traders can enter limit orders and indicative prices are set and disseminated. There are no trades at these prices, but investors can observe them. This mechanism can be useful if, by observing the indicative prices, investors can progressively coordinate on an equilibrium. But it's not clear whether such preplay communication can deliver useful and reliable information. After all, if traders can costlessly place and cancel orders, they have no clear incentives to reveal their true trading intentions and can attempt to manipulate the market. To cope with 10 Suppose the buyer has no clue about the actions of the seller and assigns equal probability to the two possible actions S1 and S2. Then, whenq = 11, the expected utility of the buyer if he plays B1 is: this problem, market organizers have designed preopening periods where it can be unattractive or difficult to cancel manipulative orders. This can involve forbidding cancellations, imposing costs for traders canceling orders, or opening the market at a random point in time. To study these issues we consider two types of preopening in our simple setup:
• The first preopening mechanism we consider is a pure cheap talk game, involving nonbinding orders. At time 0 the buyer and the seller can enter orders S0, S1 or S2 and B0, B1 or B2. These orders are matched and an indicative price is set, at which there is no trade. All investors observe the outcome of this preopening round. Then, at time 1, the preopening orders are cancelled and the traders have a new opportunity to place orders. These time 1 orders are those which will be used to set the opening prices at which actual trades will occur.
• The second preopening mechanism involves binding orders. It is designed to capture, in a simple way, attempts by market designers to curb manipulation and noisy preopening orders. At time 0 the traders can choose to place limit orders S1 or S2 and B1 or B2. Alternatively, they can choose to place no order (denoted by S0 and B0) and wait for t = 1. The outcome of this preopening round is observed by all. The difference with the nonbinding preopening is that when traders have placed orders B1, S1, B2 or S2 at t = 0, they cannot cancel these initial orders and place new ones. On the other hand, traders who have not placed orders at t = 0 have the opportunity to place orders at t = 1.
How does the presence of this preopening phase alter behavior and outcomes in our simple trading game?
When preopening orders are nonbinding, they can be discounted as pure noise by the players. In that case, actions at t = 0 are irrelevant, and equilibria at t = 1 are the same as in the market without preopening. On the other hand, players can use preopening orders as communication devices, and in that case there may be a link between orders placed at t = 0 and orders placed at t = 1. For example, the agents could agree that, if they played B2 and S2 at t = 0 then they should also play play B2 and S2 at t = 1. A more complex scheme would be for the agents to use a jointly controlled lottery, as in Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968) . For example, the players could mix between B1 and B2 (or S1 and S2) at t = 0 with equal probability. Then, at t = 1, they would coordinate on (B2, S2) if they played on the diagonal, i.e., (S1, B1) or (S2, B2) at t = 0. And they would coordinate on (B1, S1) if they played off the diagonal, i.e., (S1, B2) or (S2, B1) at t = 0. Whatever the equilibrium prevailing in the market with a nonbinding preopening, the same equilibrium actions can be observed at t = 1 as without preopening. This is stated in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 (B0, S0), (B2, S2), (B1, S1), (S1, B2) and (S2, B1) at t = 1 are equilibrium outcomes in the call market preceded by a nonbinding preopening.
With binding preopening orders, whenq = 9, there are only two equilibria: (S0, B0) and (S1, B1), and it does not matter whether the agents place their orders at time 0 or at time 1. But, whenq = 11, things are more involved.
To analyze this case, we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Thus, we rule out actions which are strictly dominated at certain nodes of the game. To do this, we first consider the case where, at time 0, the buyer played B1 and the seller chose to wait (i.e., played S0). Then, playing S2 or S0 at time 1 would be strictly dominated by the play of S1. Second, we turn to the case where, at time 0, the buyer played B2 and the seller chose to wait. Then, the play of S1 or S0 at time 1 is strictly dominated by S2. Symmetric arguments apply when the buyer chose to wait while the seller played either S1 or S2 at time 0. Thus, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Whenq = 11 in the market with a binding preopening, the set of choices for the seller that are not strictly dominated is:
• Play S0 at t = 0.
• Play S1 at t = 0.
• Play S2 at t = 0.
• Wait at t = 0 and then respond S1 if B1 or B0 was played at time and S2 if B2 was played at time 0. Denote this by Σ S 1 .
• Wait at t = 0 and then respond S1 if B1 was played at time and S2 if B2 or B0 was played at time 0. Denote this by Σ Furthermore, note that no trade, i.e., (S0, B0) at time 0 and time 1, cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Suppose the buyer anticipates the seller to wait at time 0, and then to respond S0 at t = 1 to the play of B0 at t = 0. Then the buyer is better off playing B2 at t = 0.
Thus, to analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in the market with a binding preopening, one can focus on the following normal form game: Inspecting this normal form, one can see that the game admits seven subgame perfect pure Nash equilibria, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the market with a binding preopening whenq = 11, there are seven subgame perfect pure Nash equilibria:
• (S1, B1) at t = 0,
The mixed strategy equilibria of the game are stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4
In the market with a binding preopening whenq = 11, there are 2 mixed strategies subgame perfect Nash equilibria:
• The buyer mixes between B1 at t = 0 and Σ B 1 , while the seller mixes between S1 at time 0 and Σ S 1 .
• The buyer mixes between B2 at t = 0 and Σ B 2 , while the seller mixes between S2 at time 0 and Σ S 2 .
Note that, in contrast with the two previous market structures, mixing between B1 and B2 or S1 and S2 at t = 0 or t = 1 is not an equilibrium. The intuition is the following. Could the buyer mix between B1 and B2 at t = 0? In that case the seller would be strictly better off playing S0 at t = 0 and then, at t = 1, play his best response to the realized action of the buyer. But, anticipating that the seller would wait, the buyer finds it suboptimal to mix at t = 0. Also, mixing between B1 and B2 cannot arise in equilibrium. If the buyer plans to mix between B1 and B2 at time 1, then he waits at time 0. Anticipating this, the seller is better off playing S2 at time 0. Observing that decision, the buyer then finds it suboptimal to mix at time 1.
To sharpen further our analysis of the equilibria of this game, we rely on the notion of trembling hand perfection (Selten, 1975) . In the two market structures analyzed above, that concept did not rule out any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. But the market with a binding preopening has a sequential flavour which gives bite to the notion of trembling hand perfection. First note that playing B1 (resp. S1) at time 0 is weakly dominated by playing Σ B 1 (resp. Σ S 1 ). Thus, trembling hand perfection rules out the equilibria involving the play of S1 or B1 at time 0. Intuitively, if there is a small chance that the seller trembles to S2, then the buyer is better off playing Σ B 1 than B1. This leads to our next proposition.
Proposition 5 In the market with a binding preopening whenq = 11, the only trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is (S2, B2).
Thus, while Nash equilibrium multiplicity arises in the three market structures, the three games have distinct stategic properties. When the preopening is binding there is a unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium outcome, (S2, B2). In contrast, in the pure call auction or with a nonbinding preopening period, both (S2, B2) and (S1, B1) are trembling hand perfect.
Hypotheses
2.3.1 Dominant strategy equilibrium and trembling hand perfection Whenq = 9, there is a unique undominated equilibrium outcome, whatever the structure of the trading game. Accordingly we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Whenq = 9 we expect the outcome of the game to be (S1, B1) in the three market structures. Whenq = 11, with a binding preopening period there is a unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium outcome. Accordingly we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Whenq = 11 we expect the outcome of the game to be (S2, B2) with a binding preopening period.
In the lab, Hypothesis 2 may fail to hold if the participants play (S1, B1), (S1, Σ B 1 ) or (B1, Σ S 1 ), which are subgame perfect equilibria, but not trembling hand perfect. In that sense our experimental design offers a test of the predictive power of the concept of trembling hand perfection in a simple context.
Mismatches
Whenq = 11, in all the market structures we consider there are multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria, with different levels of liquidity and gains from trade. And, while some equilibria are Pareto dominant, the Pareto dominated outcome is risk dominant. This could make it more difficult for participants to coordinate on one equilibrium. If the participants fail to achieve such coordination, we will observe frequent mismatches, with outcomes (S2, B1) or (S1, B2). However, preplay communication can be expected to facilitate coordination. Thus we expect that, when there is a preopening period with nonbinding orders, mismatches should be less frequent than in the pure call market without preopening. Furthermore, we expect mismatches at t = 0 to be even less frequent when preopening orders are binding since in that case they are not subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes. Thus we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Whenq = 11, the frequency of mismatches, whereby the outcome is (S2, B1) or (S1, B2), should be greatest in the pure call market without preopening and smallest with binding preopening orders.
Manipulation
Whenq = 9, the presence of a nonbinding preopening should have no effect on game outcomes. Participants should realize that at time 1 their opponent will always play S1 or B1, whatever his or her initial order. So they should ignore any other preopening order. At the same time, if participants are unsure whether their opponents conduct such reasoning, they might attempt to manipulate their beliefs. Thus, whenq = 9 and the preopening is not binding, they could place misleading orders, for example S2 at time 0, hoping their opponent would naively respond with B2 at time 1. If the manipulation was successful, the players would opportunistically take advantage of such naive behavior by placing S1 at time 1. And if the manipulation was unsuccessful it would not be costly to the seller, since it would end up, anyhow, with the equilibrium outcome (S1, B1). Thus we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Whenq = 9 and there is a preopening period with nonbinding orders, participants will place manipulative orders, S2 or B2 at t = 0 and then revert to S1 and B1 at t = 1. But, to the extent that their opponents are rational, the play of S2 at t = 0 will not increase the frequency of B2 at t = 1 (and symmetrically on the other side of the market).
This hypothesis is in line with the experimental results of Charness (2000) , who studies a prisoner's dilemma with nonbinding preplay communication and finds that players tend to announce cooperation but then play defection.
Cheap talk and cooperation
The nonbinding preopening is in fact a cheap talk mechanism. Whenq = 11, will such cheap talk foster coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium (S2, B2) ? Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1992) , Charness (2000) and Blume and Ortmann (2007) show experimentally that, in games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, preplay communication fosters coordination on the most efficient one. Farrell (1987) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) offer a theoretical argument to rationalize this. The intuition is the following: Of course, when non equilibrium or dominated actions are announced, preplay communication is non credible and players ignore it. But, what if I make an announcement such that if you believe me and respond optimally, then it is in my own interest to stick to my word? Farell (1987) argues that in this case my announcement should be credible. Thus, in our game, whenq = 11, participants could credibly announce during the preopening their intention to play (S2, B2) in the call auction. This suggests that the presence of the preopening period should enhance coordination on the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium and leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Whenq = 11, with a nonbinding preopening period, sellers will tend to play S2 at t = 0 and at t = 1, and buyers will respond to this by playing B2 at t = 1. The symmetric argument applies to the other side of the market.
Yet, Aumann (1990) offers a counterargument to this conjecture. Suppose I announce I will play S2 and the buyer believes me. Then he responds with B2. Now, I prefer him to choose this response irrespective of whether I really want to play B2 or B1. Thus, argues Aumann (1990) , my announcement is not self-enforcing. This suggests it may not be credible and preplay communication with nonbinding orders may not enhance coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. This is in line with Clark et al (2001) , who consider a game where the Aumann critique applies. They find that cooperation is played 42% of the time but announced 81% of the time. In our game, as in theirs, parameters are such that the Aumann's critique applies.
History
To design their strategies, players need to form beliefs about the moves of their opponents. Such beliefs are likely to be shaped by the observation of past actions, thus generating history dependence. In the market with a nonbinding preopening period, low initial gains from trades can induce pessimistic beliefs. In that market, according to Hypothesis 2, even whenq = 9, agents will play S2 or B2 at t = 0, hoping to manipulate their opponent, and then they will play S1 and B1 at t = 1. Such actions risk undermining the credibility of preplay communication. In that case, even when the maximum amount traded goes to 11, players might not respond positively to cooperative messages (S2 or B2) sent at t = 0. Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 Cooperative messages sent during the nonbinding preopening withq = 11 will elicit less positive responses when participants have previously played withq = 9.
Experimental design
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a market experiment at the Toulouse University laboratory. We studied participants behavior in three treatments: i) a pure call market without preopening, ii) a call auction preceded by a nonbinding preopening period, iii) a call auction preceded by binding preopening orders. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . The participants were seated in front of computers separated by dividers and we enforced a ban on verbal communication. The experiments involved 156 students from three different master in finance programs at Toulouse University. There were 12 cohorts. The number of participants per cohort varied between 8 and 20. Each cohort played only in one market environment.
In each cohort, participants played the market game 15 times. Each time they were randomly and blindly matched with an opponent, and this was orally announced to all by the experimenter so that it was common knowledge. Anonymity and random matching ensured that each time participants would behave as in a one-shot game. Relying on anonymous computerized interaction with a prespecified set of messages, we avoid the confounding effects associated with face to face interaction noted by Roth (1995) .
11
At each round, the computer collected all the choices and randomly matched one seller and one buyer within a given cohort. Payoffs were determined according to the normal form game table given above. At the end of each replication, each participant was informed of his or her trading gains. Subjects were not told with whom they were matched, but they were informed of the actions of their opponent. The subjects were not informed of the outcomes of the matches in which they did not participate. When there was a preopening period, the same two players were matched both for the preopening period and the subsequent call market.
To study the effect of history on behavior, we exposed participants to variations inq. In the first ten cohorts, half the participants first played 5 rounds withq = 11, followed by 5 rounds with q = 9, and then 5 more rounds withq = 11. For the other participants in these first ten cohorts, the sequencing was reversed: they first played 5 rounds withq = 9, then 5 rounds withq = 11, and finally 5 rounds withq = 9. We did not tell the participants what the exact process ofq would be. We just informed them thatq would vary between 9 and 11 across rounds and participants. Whenq changed, we clearly warned the participants of this alteration in the parameters via screen messages, to avoid any confusion.
We also wanted to disentangle the pure effect of market structure from its effect combined with history. To do so, we also ran the experimental market keepingq constant. Since, as will be clear below, experimental outcomes are quite straightforward whenq = 9 and also in the pure call auction, we ran these control experiments only forq = 11 and for the market with a binding preopening and that with a nonbinding one. This control treatment enables us to check that, as predicted by Hypothesis 6, there is a difference between the first five rounds and the next ones for the cohorts which faced changes inq, not for the other ones. It also enables us to examine the difference between the binding and nonbinding preopening cases in absence of changes inq, and thus to test directly Hypotheses 2,3,4 and 5.
The composition of the cohorts and the treatments are summarized in Table 1 . We first ran the experiment with 7 cohorts, in the context of our original design, which involved the three market structure and changes inq. Then, to check the robustness of the difference between the binding and nonbinding preopenings, we replicated the experiment for these two market structures (keeping the changes inq as in the first 7 cohorts). The results obtained for all these cohorts are qualitatively similar, hence we report results based on pooled data. Finally, to control for the role of variations in market conditions, we studied the benchmark case where there are no changes inq.
In each cohort, we first explained the game to the participants and gave them an instruction sheet. An example of the instructions, for the pure call auction market, is given in Appendix. We answered questions to ensure the participants understood the mechanics of the market. At the same time we carefully avoided giving them any hints as to how they should play. This presentation phase lasted around thirty minutes. Then the market game took place. First, each cohort went through 6 practice rounds. Then, the 15 "real" rounds took place. At each round the participants had 3 minutes to place their orders. In the pure call auction case, this meant they had 3 minutes to choose which order to place in the call auction. When there was a preopening, participants had 90 seconds to choose the orders they would place during the preopening and then 90 seconds to place orders in the call auction. We chose this design to ensure that the total decision time would be the same across all treatments. This way, if superior performance was obtained in markets with a preopening period, it could not be due to longer decision time. Overall the market game lasted around one hour and a half for each cohort. The participants were also told that, after the 15 sessions, they would receive a payment in euros equal to their total number of points divided by 15. The average payment was e 18, the minimum was 15 and the maximum 21.
Results

Executed orders
Pooling buyers and sellers, Table 2 presents the orders that were taken into account to generate trades.
12 To document the evolution of behavior, the table breaks down the results obtained during the first five periods, the following five periods, and the last five periods. Panels A and B depict what happens when participants faced varying parameter values. Panels A and B correspond to treatments that begin withq = 11 andq = 9, respectively. Panels A2, B1 and B3 correspond to the periods during whichq = 9. As stated below, in that case, participants easily discover the dominant strategy equilibrium, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Finding 1 Whenq = 9, the most frequent actions are B1 and S1, with frequencies ranging from 78% in the pure call auction during the first five rounds, to 95.8% in the market with a binding preopening period during the last five rounds. Panels A1, A3 and B2 present the findings forq = 11. The most frequent actions are B2 and S2, corresponding to the Pareto dominant equilibrium, but there are large variations across market structures and through time. When the participants play withq = 11 during the first five rounds, the difference between the three market structures is relatively small, as B2 or S2 is played 76% of the time in the pure call auction, 60.8% when the preopening is nonbinding, and 73, 3% when it is binding (the difference between the pure call auction and the auction with a binding preopening is not statistically significant). But, later in the experiment, the performances of the three market structures diverge.
Consider the case where participants play withq = 11 after having been exposed toq = 9:
• In the pure call auction, the proportion of B2 or S2 is equal to 58% in rounds 6 to 10 (see Panel B2), and 54% in rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3). This is statistically different, at the 5% level, from the frequency observed during the first five rounds (76%).
• In the market where the preopening is nonbinding, the proportion of B2 or S2 is 50.8%
in rounds 6 to 10 (see Panel B2), which is statistically different, at the 5% level, from the frequency observed during the first five rounds. The proportion of B2 or S2 is 56.7% in rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3). This is lower than, but not statistically different from, the frequency observed in the first five rounds (60.8%).
• With a binding preopening, the percentage of B2 or S2 is 87.5% in rounds 6 to 10 (see Panel B2), and 90.8% in rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3), which is even higher than the frequency observed during the first five rounds (73.3%).
These findings are summarized below:
Finding 2 Whenq = 11, if players have not previously been exposed toq = 9, the frequency of B2 and S2 is relatively high. If the players have previously been exposed toq = 9, then the frequency of B2 or S2 is relatively low in the pure call auction and in the market with a binding preopening period. But it is quite high in the market with a binding preopening period.
Thus the nonbinding preopening does not increase the play of B2 and S2. This contradicts Hypothesis 5, and is more in line with the Aumann critique than with the argument of Farell. In contrast, the preopening facilitates coordination on high liquidity and gains from trade when it involves binding orders. This is consistent with participants reaching the unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium outcome, in line with Hypothesis 2.
Panel C of Table 2 presents the results obtained in the benchmark case whereq is constant and equal to 11. Similarly to Panels A and B, we see that the market with a binding preopening period outperforms the market with a nonbinding period. But, in contrast with Panels A and B, we observe no difference between the first five rounds and the next five rounds. When the preopening period is nonbinding, the frequency of B2 or S2 is 43% during the first five rounds and 45% during the next five rounds. When the preopening period is binding, the frequency of B2 or S2 is 77% during the first five rounds and 76% during the next five rounds. This confirms that the decline of the performance of the nonbinding preopening observed in panels B2 and A3 is due to the reaction of participants to previous bitter experiences. We also observe, in Panel C3 of Table 2 that the market with a nonbinding preopening performs poorly during the last five rounds. This may reflect that participants were getting bored after playing more than 10 replications of the same game. Their behavior at this point contrasts with persistence of the coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium in the market with a binding preopening period, which offers yet another illustration of the efficiency of the latter market structure.
Mismatches
The results are in Table 3 . Whenq = 11, the frequency of (S1, B2) or (S2, B1) is statistically significantly larger, at the 5% level, in the pure call auction than in the market with a nonbinding preopening. And this frequency is statistically significantly lower with a binding preopening than with a nonbinding one. These results, which are consistent with Hypothesis 3, are summarized below:
Finding 3 Mismatches such as (S1, B2) or (S2, B1) are rather frequent in the pure call auction.
In contrast the presence of a preopening period reduces the occurrence of mismatches, especially in the market with a binding preopening. Table 3 , also shows that mismatches are more frequent whenq = 11 than whenq = 9. This is natural since there are multiple equilibria in the former case and not in the latter (whenq = 9, whether the preopening period is binding or not does not statistically affect the frequency of mismatches). Table 4 documents the evolution of the orders placed by the same player at t = 0 and then t = 1. Panels A to D present the evidence for the treatment where participants faced changes inq. Panels E and F present the evidence for the control treatment whereq was kept constant at 11.
Manipulation and coordination during the preopening period 4.3.1 Orders placed during the preopening and the opening
As can be seen in panel A, in the nonbinding preopening period whenq = 9, the majority of the orders (63.6%) is of type B2 or S2. But after sending such "cooperative messages," the agents shift to the opposite strategy at t = 1 and play B1 or S1 92.6% of the time. These results, which are consistent with Hypothesis 4, are summarized below:
Finding 4 Whenq = 9, in the nonbinding preopening, orders are manipulative: players "announce cooperation" at t = 0 but "play defection" at t = 1.
In contrast, Panel B of Table 4 shows that in the binding preopening period whenq = 9, the vast majority of the orders (77.8%) is of type B0 or S0 at t = 0. Since playing B2 or S2 during the preopening would be binding, players cannot try to manipulate their opponent. So they often choose to wait. After these non-committing orders, in the vast majority of cases (93.2%), players follow the dominant strategy B1 or S1 at t = 1. Whenq = 11, as shown in Panels C and E of Table 4 , in the nonbinding preopening period the majority of the orders is of type B2 or S2 (80.0% in Panel C and 74.3% in Panel E). These orders tend to be informative since orders placed at t = 1 are related to those placed at t = 0. However time 0 orders are not always reliable indications of subsequent play, since, at t = 1, agents play B2 or S2 only 60.1% of the time in Panel C and 43.5% in Panel E.
Panel D and F show that, in the binding preopening period whenq = 11, agents often choose to wait (44.4% of the cases in Panel D and 45.3 % in Panel F) . This is likely to reflect uncertainty about the play of their opponent. Yet, during the binding preopening, a significant fraction of the orders placed at t = 0 is of type B2 or S2 (52.5% in Panel D and 46% in Panel F). Such orders commit the players to B2 or S2 at t = 1. They are likely to reflect coordination by the agents on the trembling hand perfect equilibrium, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Table 5 documents how the players responded at time 1 to the order posted by their opponent during the preopening. Again Panels A to D present the evidence for the treatment where participants faced changes inq, while Panels E and F present the evidence for the control treatment whereq was kept constant at 11. Whenq = 9, as shown in Panel A, in the market with a nonbinding preopening period, agents' actions at t = 1 are not affected by their opponent's move at t = 0. In the vast majority of cases, the agents play S1 or B1 at t = 1. The play of B2 or S2 at t = 0 by their opponent does not induce them to play B2 or S2 at t = 1. This result, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4, is stated below:
The response to preopening orders
Finding 5 In the nonbinding preopening, whenq = 9, attempts to manipulate are frequent but ineffective.
Panel B presents the results obtained in the market with a binding preopening whenq = 9. This panel reports the choices made at time 1 by participants who chose to wait at time 0 (the others are committed by their time 0 move and therefore have no opportunity to respond.) In that market also, the vast majority of agents respond B1 or S1 at t = 1, whatever the move of their opponent at time 0. Thus, participants play dominant strategies, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Whenq = 11, as shown in Panels C and E of Table 5 , in the market with a nonbinding preopening period, agents tend to be responsive to the order placed by their opponent at time 0. When the preopening order of their opponent was B1 or S1, they play B1 or S1 85.4% of the time in Panel C and 82.1% in Panel E. When the preopening order of their opponent was B2 or S2, they play B2 or S2 62.8% of the time in Panel C and 46.6% in Panel E. Thus, the response to the play of B2 or S2 during the preopening tends to be weak. This suggests participants don't place a lot of trust in the preopening orders. Panels D and F present, for the binding preopening andq = 11, the choices made at time 1 by participants who chose to wait at time 0. The response to B1 or S1 (100% of S1 or B1 in Panel D and 81.8% in Panel F) and the response to B2 or S2 (81.9% of S2 or B2 in Panel D and 91.3% in Panel F) show that players best respond. Since players rarely choose to play B1 or S1 at date t = 0, this result again illustrates that the binding preopening is effective at fostering coordination on the Pareto dominant outcome, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the evolution of the response of the players to the order posted by their opponent during the preopening.
History dependence
13 Table 6 documents the case where the maximum trade was 11 during the first five rounds, changed to 9 during the next five rounds, and finally reverted to 11 during the last 5 rounds. Table 7 presents the evidence for the other possible sequence, for which the maximum trade was 9 during the first five rounds, 11 during the next five rounds, and 9 during the last 5 rounds. The first type of sequence corresponds to the case where the agents started interacting in rather good market conditions (q = 11), where high gains from trade could be achieved in equilibrium. In contrast, the second type of sequence started with tough market conditions (q = 9), where equilibrium generated low gains from trade. Finally, Table 8 presents the evidence for the treatment whereq was constant and equal to 11 during the 15 rounds.
The market with a nonbinding preopening period
Panel A of Table 6 shows that during the first five rounds, when the maximum trade is 11, so that there are two Nash equilibria (S1, B1) and (S2, B2), the messages sent during the nonbinding preopening period influence actions at t = 1. When their opponent played B1 or S1 during the preopening period, agents play B1 or S1 77.8% of the time. And when their opponent played B2 or S2 during the preopening period, agents play B2 or S2 69.6% of the time.
14 This contrasts with Panel B of Table 7 , which shows the responses observed during rounds 5 to 10, when the maximum trade is currently 11, but the agents have experiencedq = 9 during the first 5 rounds. In that case the play of B1 or S1 during the preopening does elicit the response B1 or S1 at t = 1. But when their opponent played B2 or S2 during the preopening, agents respond with B2 or S2 at t = 1 only 57.7% of the time. A Chi-square test reveals that this is statistically different, at the 5% level, from the frequency observed during the first five rounds, i.e., 69.6%. During the first five rounds, these agents have observed manipulative announces of B2 or S2 at t = 0, followed by the play of B1 or S1 at t = 1. Thus they have lost faith in the credibility of "cooperative messages" sent during the preopening. Hence, consistent with Hypothesis 6, the play of B2 or S2 during the preopening period often fails to elicit a positive B2 or S2 response.
A similar but less strong phenomenon is documented in Panel C of Table 6 , which shows the responses observed during rounds 11 to 15, when the maximum trade is currently 11, but was 9 during the previous market phase. These agents have experienced fruitful cooperation during the first five rounds of the game, and then manipulative messages during the next five rounds.
Correspondingly, on observing that their opponent played B2 or S2 during the preopening period, they respond B2 or S2 61.6% of the time. This is below the strong positive response rate which prevailed for those agents during the first five periods (69.6%) but this difference is significant at the 10% level only. And it is not significantly above the weak response rate (57.7%) prevailing during rounds 6 to 10, for agents who had started the games with five rounds of tough market conditions, withq = 9. Table 8 presents the evidence for the control treatment whereq is constant and equal to 11. As in the other cases, agents tend to respond B1 to S1 and S1 to B1. The extent to which they respond positively to B2 or S2 is relatively limited. But, in contrast with the evidence in Tables 6  and 7 , there is no decline in the frequency of positive responses from the first five periods the next five periods. Quite to the contrary there is an increase: During the first five periods, after observing B2 or S2, participants respond S2 or B2 52.1% of the time. During the next five periods, the frequency of such positive responses rises non significantly to 56.6%. It must be noted, however, that there is an eventual decline in the frequency of positive responses, during the last five rounds.
These results, which are consistent with Hypothesis 6, are summarized below:
Finding 6 In the nonbinding preopening, whenq = 11, the positive response elicited by the play of B2 or S2 at time 0 is weaker when participants have previously been exposed toq = 9 than when they have not.
The market with a binding preopening period
Interestingly, the evolution of play is quite different in the market with a binding preopening period. There, whenq = 11, the frequency of positive responses to B2 or S2 during the preopening is 70.4% during the first five rounds (see Table 6 Panel A), 93.8% during the next five rounds (see Table 7 , Panel B) and 80% during the last five rounds (see Table 6 , Panel C). These results, which are in line with Hypothesis 2, are summarized below:
Finding 7 When the preopening is binding andq = 11, coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium is robust to tough market conditions, as the frequency of B2 or S2 remains high after agents have experienced markets withq = 9.
The difference between the two types of preopening periods directly manifests itself only when q = 11. Whenq = 9, (S1, B1) is a dominant strategy equilibrium, and this equilibrium arises irrespective of the market structure. But the behavior of the participants during the preopening whenq = 9 has indirect effects, since it influences their beliefs and consequently their actions at later stages in the game. Table 8 shows that the frequency of positive responses to B2 or S2 is also very large in the control treatment whereq is constant.
Conclusion
We study experimentally the performance of three trading mechanisms: i) a pure call auction, ii) a nonbinding preopening period followed by a call auction, and iii) a binding preopening period followed by a call auction. We investigate whether the preopening period facilitates coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium and how its role is affected by the evolution of market conditions.
We find that, with a nonbinding preopening period, agents try to manipulate their opponents by sending noncredible, falsely "cooperative," messages. While these messages don't fool traders, they reduce the credibility of preopening orders. Thus, in the market with a nonbinding preopening period, gains from trade are relatively low. In contrast, by construction, the binding preopening period is immune to manipulation. It enables traders to achieve high coordination and gains from trade.
While our analysis suggests that the poor performance of the nonbinding preopening is due to agents learning to distrust announces, we don't formally model learning or beliefs formation. It would be interesting, in future research to analyze such beliefs dynamics. To conduct this analysis, one could rely on the models of learning dynamics in coordination games offered by Crawford and Haller (1990) and Crawford (1995) .
Our experiment offers a warning to market designers. Purely nonbinding preopening mechanisms can be destabilized by manipulative traders. In contexts where gains from trade are limited, traders can be tempted to use preplay communication in an opportunistic way. This could have a long-lasting negative effect on the credibility and usefulness of the preopening period. But market organizers can strive to design effective communication mechanisms to cope with this problem. Admittedly, the fully binding preopening mechanism considered in the present paper is a rather coarse solution. In practice, market designers might find it more effective to rely on less simplistic methods. For example, in several markets (e.g. the German stock market Xetra), the actual time of the opening is random. Thus, preopening orders end up being firm orders with some probability, when the market opens before the order could be cancelled. Other methods are to constrain the ability of the traders to revise their orders. For example, in some markets, orders can be cancelled only if they are replaced with new orders providing more liquidity to the market. Or market designers can impose a fee on cancellations taking place during the preopening period.
Our results should nevertheless be taken with a grain of salt. Our trading game is highly stylized. Other important effects are likely to be at play in real markets and affect the usefulness of preopening mechanisms. In particular, in our experiment, while there is strategic uncertainty (about the actions of the others), there is no uncertainty about parameters of the game, such as the maximum level of trade or the value of the asset. Introducing such uncertainty would enrich the analysis and the potential role of the preopening period. We leave these issues for further research.
Appendix: Instructions to participants, in the pure call market (without a preopening)
In this market you can place buy or sell limit orders in a uniform price call auction. If you play astutely you can make some good money. Buyers start with no share. Each share they buy is worth 4 points for them.
Sellers start each trading round with a new endowment of 9 or 11 shares. For them each share is worth 0 point. All traders know how many shares the seller has. There is no link between periods. Cash or shares are not carried over from one period to the next. At the end of each round we compute profits. For buyers this is: number shares bought ×(4 − price). For sellers this is: number of shares sold × price. At the end of the experiment you receive in e your profit divided by 15. Only profits matter (as opposed to total wealth) and buyers are assumed to have enough cash to pay for the shares they want to acquire. At each round, each seller chooses between 3 schedules of limit orders:
• S0: Don't sell at any price,
• S1: One order to sell 8 shares if price not below 2; another order to sell X additional shares if price not below 3,
• S2: One order to sell 8 shares if price not below 1; another order to sell additional X shares if price not below 2, and each buyer chooses between 3 schedules of limit orders.
• B0: Don't want to buy at any price,
• B1: One limit order to buy 8 shares if the price is not above 2; another limit order to buy X additional shares if the price is not above 1,
• B2: One limit order to buy 8 shares if the price is not above 3; another limit order to buy X additional shares if the price is not above 2.
When the maximum trade is 11, then X = 3. When the maximum trade is 9, X = 1.
When the maximum trade is 11 shares, the possible trades and profits are the following:
• B0 or S0: no trade, profits = 0.
• B2 & S2: price = 2, volume = 11. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 22.
• B1 & S1: price = 2, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 16.
• B1 & S2: price = 1.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 20, profit of seller = 12.
• B2 & S1: price = 2.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 12, profit of seller = 20.
When the maximum trade is 9 shares, the possible trades and profits are the following:
• B2 & S2: price = 2, volume = 9. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 18.
We will start with 6 warm up rounds, so that you can familiarize with the game (no points will be earned during these 6 rounds). During these 6 rounds you'll sometimes be a buyer and sometimes a seller. Then, there will be 15 trading rounds, during which you'll earn e. The number of e you will earn will be your total accumulated profit/15. At the beginning of the 15 rounds, you will be assigned a role: buyer or seller, which you'll keep throughout the game. In some rounds the maximum trade will be 9 shares, in others max number of shares traded will be 11. At each round, before players choose orders, the maximum trade will be announced to all. Table 6 : Evolution of response to preopening orders
The first 5 rounds were played withq = 11, the next 5 rounds withq = 9, and the last 5 rounds withq = 11.
Panel A: Rounds 1 to 5,q = 11 Preopening nonbinding Binding My opponent
My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1 at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 Table 7 : Evolution of response to preopening orders
The first 5 rounds were played withq = 9, the next 5 rounds withq = 11, and the last 5 rounds withq = 9.
Panel A: Rounds 1 to 5,q = 9 Preopening nonbinding Binding My opponent
My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1 at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1 at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 -100.0% -1.3% 97.4% 1.3% B1 or S1 -90.7% 9.3% -100.0% -B2 or S2 -94.0% 6.0% -100.0% - 
